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Obscenity & Indecency Law: Why Howl Is Still Silenced
Nadine Strossen
I'm delighted to celebrate this important new book by the Dynamic
Duo, Ron Collins and David Skover. Not only are David and Ron long-
time colleagues of mine, but that's also true of the other speakers today.
However, on every prior occasion when Richard Delgado and I have
shared the podium, we have debated each other, so it's a nice change to
be advocating on the same conclusion today-namely, the importance of
Mania!
I so admire Al Bendich's pioneering work on the landmark Howl
First Amendment case, which is especially impressive given that he was
a recent law school graduate at the time. For all of the law students and
young lawyers in the audience, this should be very inspiring, showing
that you can have a profound impact on the law from the very outset of
your legal careers.
As an activist, I'm necessarily an optimist, so let me start with the
positive aspect of Al's remarkable achievement in this case way back in
1957. Judge Horn's speech-protective decision, which drew so extensive-
ly from Al's brief, was a high-water mark of First Amendment protection
for sexually-oriented expression. Just that year, in the Roth case,' the Su-
preme Court had for the very first time addressed the status of sexual
expression under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Roth was
written by the then-new Justice William Brennan, who has gone down in
history as ultimately becoming a great defender of freedom of speech,
but that was not yet true at the outset of his Supreme Court career. It's an
interesting juxtaposition. Here's Al, at the outset of his legal career, real-
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ly being a pioneering leader and trailblazer in defending First Amend-
ment rights. When he wrote the majority's opinion in Roth, Justice Bren-
nan had been on the Supreme Court for a very short time, less than one
year. He didn't yet have the courage of his convictions or the experience
that would shortly thereafter start leading him in a speech-protective di-
rection.
There's no exception in the First Amendment for sexual expression.
Moreover, Justice Brennan begins his Roth opinion by extolling the im-
portance of sexual expression: "Sex, a great and mysterious motive force
in human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to
mankind through the ages."2 Probably the least controversial pro-
nouncement the Justices have ever made, right? But, they then, nonethe-
less, proceeded to read into the First Amendment's unqualified language
an exception for a vaguely-defined subset of sexual expression that was
labeled "obscenity." The Howl case was the first major case to actually
implement this newly-authorized exception. Thanks to Al's scholarly
advocacy, Judge Horn did great damage control, construing that excep-
tion as narrowly as plausible. So, that's the good news.
But, it's also the bad news, because to this date, almost 60 years
later, this case remains a high-water mark of freedom for sexual expres-
sion. The Supreme Court still hasn't even cut back on the scope of the
obscenity exception that it laid down in Roth, let alone eliminated it alto-
gether, as First Amendment experts overwhelmingly advocate. To the
contrary, since 1957, the Court has issued multiple decisions that in-
crease government power to suppress sexual expression. I'm going to
note the two lines of such decisions that are most directly on point for
Howl.
First, the Court expressly reaffirmed the obscenity exception in
1973 in companion cases called Paris3 and Miller.4 It did this by deeply-
split, five to four votes, with the dissent written by none other than Jus-
tice Brennan, who had written the majority opinion in Roth, but who con-
fessed error based on his 16 years of actual experience in enforcing this
inherently subjective concept. Worse yet, in its 1973 rulings, the Court
actually broadened the obscenity exception in one respect. Roth had held
that the Free Speech Clause protects any expression with even the slight-
est redeeming social importance. Rather, to be unprotected obscenity, the
expression had to be "utterly without redeeming social value."5 In con-
trast, in 1973, Miller ramped up this social value requirement substantial-
2. Id. at 487.
3. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
4. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419-20 (1966).
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ly. Al understandably complained during his remarks that he had to show
that Howl had any value, but any value is no longer enough after 1973.
Now the Court says the speech must have serious value, which is even
more contrary to the fundamental First Amendment principles that Al
talked about. In general, the First Amendment means that it is up to each
of us as individuals to determine which expression has value for us; we
are not confined to only that expression that the government certifies as
having serious value. However, in the area of obscenity, that's what we
are relegated to since 1973.
Now I'll turn to the second pertinent line of Supreme Court deci-
sions suppressing sexual expression: rulings upholding the ban on so-
called "indecent" broadcast expression between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00
p.m., on the ground that children are most likely to be in the audience
then. The Court first made this holding with respect to broadcast inde-
cency in the famous-or infamous-1978 Pacifica case, when it upheld
an order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) sanctioning
a broadcast of comedian George Carlin's satirical "Seven Dirty Words"
monologue.6 Indecency is a far broader concept than obscenity. To come
within the Court's obscenity exception, material has to satisfy all three
prongs of the definition that the Court laid down in the 1973 Miller case.
First, picking up one of the requirements from Roth, the expression must
appeal to the so-called "prurient interest in sex"; in other words, it has to
be sexually arousing. I should note that the Supreme Court later clarified
that a prurient interest in sex is a "sick and morbid" interest in sex, as
opposed to a "normal and healthy" one.7 Second, the expression has to be
patently offensive.
Kathleen Sullivan, a former professor at Stanford Law School who
is now practicing law in New York, went through this definition of "pru-
rient interest in sex" in her constitutional law class. She explained to her
students that there's a contradiction here. Because if you put it in lay
terms, what does it mean that something appeals to the prurient interest
in sex? Well, that means that it turns you on. But what does it mean that
the material is patently offensive? Well, that means that it grosses you
out. So, how can the same thing both turn you on and gross you out?
Here's the answer: It's because one person's turn-on-that is, the person
who read it or the person who wrote it-grosses out somebody else-
namely, the police, the prosecutor, the jury, and the judge. And there in a
nutshell is one of the many fundamental contradictions between the
whole concept of illegal obscenity and a free society. The majority, as
6. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
7. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 492, 498 (1985).
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represented by the prosecuting and convicting authorities, is making a
negative determination about the sexual pleasures and expressions of the
individual who's on trial.
The third requirement that also has to be satisfied, in addition to the
prurient interest and patently offensive criteria, is that the material has to
lack serious value. Now, on that definition, I would like to share an an-
ecdote about one of my judicial heroes whom Al has already mentioned.
He is Justice William 0. Douglas, who of course hails from right here in
Washington State. Justice Douglas always opposed the obscenity excep-
tion, consistent with his staunch First Amendment absolutism in general.
While the other Justices would watch screenings of films that were al-
leged to be obscene to determine whether they satisfied Miller's criteria,
Justice Douglas always refused to participate. He repudiated the role of
official censor.
Anyone who has read The Brethren might recall that it contains
quite amusing descriptions of the Justices watching these screenings. At
my law school, New York Law School, one of our claims to fame is a
Supreme Court Justice who graduated from our law school, Justice Mar-
shall Harlan. The Brethren recounts how Justice Harlan had become near
blind late'r in his life, so he would bring one of his law clerks down to the
screening room with him and the law clerk, in front of all the other Jus-
tices, would have to give a blow-by-blow oral description. One line in
The Brethren is from Harlan upon hearing his clerk's description of a
scene in an allegedly obscene film. He says: "By Jove, extraordinary!"
The story I wanted to share about Justice Douglas's views of the
Miller test comes from a lawyer colleague who saw Douglas in the Su-
preme Court cafeteria and struck up a conversation with him that includ-
ed the Court's obscenity exception. Here's what Justice Douglas said to
my friend:
The longer I've sat on the Court, the more I oppose the doctrine.
Some people think it's because I'm getting more tolerant in my old-
er age, but here's the real reason. The Court has said that to find
something obscene, it has to be sexually arousing, and the older I
get, alas, the harder it is for me to become sexually aroused.
In contrast with the three-pronged Miller test for obscenity, broad-
cast expression will be deemed indecent and hence banned until late at
night merely by satisfying the single offensiveness prong. In Pacifica,
the Court upheld the FCC's definition of broadcast indecency, which is
still in effect: patently offensive depictions or descriptions of sexual or
excretory organs or activities. So broadcast expression can be indecent
even if it's not sexually arousing, and even worse, it doesn't matter how
valuable the expression is. Serious value, even very serious value, is
lxiv [Vol. 37:i
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completely irrelevant and will not save broadcast expression once it has
been deemed patently offensive.
There are many instructive parallels between these rulings I've de-
scribed, which set the First Amendment standards for obscenity and
broadcast indecency. Amazingly, here in the twenty-first century, we're
still governed by the 1973 Paris-Miller rulings on obscenity and the
1978 Pacifica case on broadcast indecency. In these cases, the decisions
were 5-4 over very strong dissents, and the lower courts had struck down
the speech restrictions at issue as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
general First Amendment jurisprudence. These facts underscore that the-
se Supreme Court rulings were really outliers, based on the narrow ma-
jority's selective squeamishness about sexual expression in particular. In
that sense, the Court simply reflects American's general fear of anything
sexual consistent with our Puritan heritage. And here I would like to cite
my fellow Minnesotan, Garrison Keiller, who said: "My ancestors were
Puritans from England who arrived here in 1648 in the hope of finding
greater restrictions than were permissible under English law at the time."
And now, let me mention two more parallels between the Court's
speech-suppressive obscenity and broadcast indecency decisions from
the 1970s. In both situations, the Court's decisions have been strongly
criticized since then by many justices from across the ideological spec-
trum, but never again has the Court revisited the basic issue of whether
obscenity or broadcast indecency should be constitutionally unprotected.
As for broadcast indecency, the Court ducked this issue twice in the past
few years, even though it was squarely presented in a case called FCC v.
Fox, in which the lower courts held that the FCC's broadcasting-
indecency regime violates the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court
both times decided the case on a narrower issue.
That leads to one final important parallel between the obscenity and
broadcast indecency doctrines. In both, the current law is actually more
speech restrictive than it was decades ago. I already noted that the 1973
Miller decision broadened the obscenity exception in a key respect by
extending it to material that admittedly does have value but whose value,
the courts say, is not sufficiently serious. And in the past decade, both the
FCC and Congress have broadened the broadcast indecency ban in sev-
eral ways. For one thing, the FCC diametrically changed the position it
had advocated and the Court had upheld in the 1978 Pacifica case, ban-
8. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002, and
March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664 (2006), vacated in part, 21 FCC Rcd. 13299 (2006), vacated and
remanded sub. nom. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), rev 'd and
remanded, 556 U.S. 502 (2009), on remand 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded,
132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
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ning only specific words that were repeated many times, as in the Carlin
monologue at issue, what the majority called a "verbal shock treatment."9
Now though, in contrast, the FCC bans even what it calls a "fleeting" or
"isolated" four-letter word or a similar brief episode of partial nudity.
Therefore, a whole broadcast can be condemned just because of a single
F-word or S-word, and likewise for a mere glimpse of a breast for 9/16
of one second, as in the infamous 2004 Super Bowl wardrobe malfunc-
tion. My favorite description of that was, "a tempest in a B-cup." Worse
yet, in 2006, Congress increased the fine for each indecency violation,
literally by a factor of ten, from $32,500 to $325,000 per word that is
deemed to be indecent. Finally, the FCC used to treat each broadcast
network and all of its affiliates as a single entity, so a program with a
forbidden word would constitute a single violation, even if it was aired
on multiple affiliates. But under the George W. Bush administration, the
FCC began to assess separate fines on every network affiliate that carried
the program. In sum, you multiply each four-letter word times each affil-
iate, times $325,000, and you can understand why the FCC's fines
reached record-breaking levels with an enormous chilling effect. This
brings us very sadly and ironically to the connection to Howl.
In 2007, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the great free
speech victory in the Howl trial, the Pacifica affiliate in my hometown,
New York, WBAI, thought what better way to celebrate this great First
Amendment landmark than airing the historic recording of Allen Gins-
berg reading his own poem? But guess what? In light of the FCC's
ramped-np broadcast indecency rules, on advice of counsel, the plug was
pulled on that. Just think of the number of four-letter words in Howl,
multiply them times $325,000, and you understand that the proposed
broadcast could have bankrupted WBAl many times over. Al, when you
won your great First Amendment victory, vindicating Howl as constitu-
tionally protected expression, would you have dreamt that a half century
later, it couldn't safely be read even on Pacifica radio, even in Manhat-
tan? This episode really crystallizes the overall point that I've been mak-
ing, how the First Amendment law in this specific area has regressed ra-
ther than progressed since 1957.
Sadly, Pacifica's pulling the plug on Howl is only one of many
concrete examples of expression with very serious, important value that
have been chilled by the recent ratcheting up of the broadcast indecency
regime. Let me cite a few other examples. A PBS station cancelled a his-
torical documentary about Marie Antoinette because it contained sexual-
ly suggestive drawings. CBS affiliates pulled a documentary about the
9. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring).
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9/11 terrorist attacks, which showed actual footage of police and fire-
fighters bravely trying to rescue people, and as the Twin Towers came
crashing down, they were exclaiming in horror and not surprisingly,
some of the horrified words had four letters. Therefore, CBS decided it
could not air this. A Vermont public radio station barred the airing of a
live political debate between state senate candidates. Notably, there is no
news exception for the ban on indecency, and news programs have been
sanctioned. Therefore, the manager for that Vermont radio station feared
that one candidate might do again on air what he had done during a pre-
vious live debate-he lost his temper and called two audience members
"shits." So much for that political debate.
To recap what I've covered so far, from a free speech perspective,
the legal standards applicable to Howl have backslid substantially since
1957, allowing more restrictions on obscenity and broadcast indecency.
Now I want to underscore how inconsistent these developments are
with the Court's free speech jurisprudence in other areas. There is both a
negative and a positive perspective here. The negative is how unjustifi-
ably the Court has discriminated against sexual expression and also
broadcast expression, but here's the corresponding positive: The unprin-
cipled nature of these rulings makes me confident that when the Court
does finally revisit them, it will overturn them. Let me start by just listing
the core free speech principles that the Supreme Court has consistently
enforced in other areas, which are diametrically different from its rulings
concerning obscenity and broadcast indecency.
First, the Court has stressed that "the bedrock principle" 0 underly-
ing the First Amendment is that government may not restrict speech
based on disapproval or dislike of its content.
Second, the Court has said that no criminal law may be based mere-
ly on the majority's sense of morality. Therefore, even assuming that
even the majority of our fellow citizens might be morally offended by
obscene or indecent expression, that's no justification for punishing it.
Third, in all other contexts, the Court has held that adults may not
be denied access to expression for the sake of protecting children.
Fourth, in every other medium other than over-the-air broadcasts,
the Court has held that indecent expression is constitutionally protected.
Fifth, the Court has protected all manner of expression that most
people consider deeply offensive, harmful to children, and dangerous to
society overall.
10. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310, 319 (1990).
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Now I would like to expand a bit on the fourth and fifth points. The
fourth point, again, is that in every other medium, other than over-the-air
broadcasts, the Court has held that indecent expression is constitutionally
protected. It has so held regarding expression transmitted by writing, in
person, telephone, Internet, and cable. Pacifica and a couple of even old-
er cases allowed more restriction of broadcasts on the ground that it is
uniquely pervasive and accessible to children. That rationale was strong-
ly contested even at the time. Moreover, since then, given the many
technological changes, it has become even less persuasive, thus prompt-
ing calls to reverse Pacifica from wide-ranging critics, including even
past FCC officials who previously supported it and Supreme Court Jus-
tices as ideologically diverse as Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Gins-
burg. So far, though, these calls have been to no avail.
The fifth point, again, was that the Court has protected all manner
of expression that most people consider deeply offensive. Examples in-
clude: hate speech, even cross burning; speech advocating crime and vio-
lence; speech that endangers national security; speech that is deeply in-
sulting and upsetting, such as burning the American flag and strident an-
ti-gay, anti-military, and anti-Catholic protests near military funerals.
Some recent examples include: speech that depicts violent crimes, such
as the depiction of torture of small animals; virtual child pornography;
tobacco ads that are deliberately aimed at children; and violent video
games sold to children. In every single one of these cases, the Court has
consistently, and in my view correctly, held that government may censor
expression only as a last resort, when the speech will inevitably cause
great harm and no other measure, which is less speech suppressive, can
avert that harm. The Court has consistently demanded evidence both that
the speech does actual harm and that no less censorial measure will avert
that harm.
In contrast, when it comes to indecency and obscenity, the Court
has acknowledged that there is no evidence of harm. So, for example, in
the 1973 Paris case, the narrow majority conceded, "[T]here are no sci-
entific data which conclusively demonstrate that exposure to obscene
material adversely affects men or women or their society."" Nonethe-
less, these five Justices asserted that such material could still be banned
based on what they unabashedly called "unprovable assumptions" about
its negative impacts on the moral "tone" of "a decent society."l 2
And finally, in addition to flying in the face of the Court's free
speech rulings in all other areas, this approach is also squarely incon-
11. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973).
12. Id.
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sistent with the Court's landmark 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas.'3
In that case, the Court overturned an anti-sodomy law that singled out
same-sex sodomy. Even more fundamentally, Lawrence held that crimi-
nal laws may not constitutionally be based only on majoritarian views
about morality. That holding provoked the fiercest tirade in Justice Scal-
ia's strident dissent. He rightly recognized that logically it would doom a
whole host of laws, far beyond the discriminatory anti-sodomy law in
Lawrence itself, and his list of endangered laws expressly included anti-
obscenity laws. In fact, soon after the Lawrence decision, a federal judge
did hold that it did spell the death knell for anti-obscenity laws,14 and
while an appellate court overturned that ruling, it did not do so because it
disagreed with this application of Lawrence's rationale. Rather, the ap-
pellate court said that only the Supreme Court itself could directly apply
its Lawrence holding to the obscenity context.'5 And I'm cautiously op-
timistic that, before long, the Supreme Court will do just that.
I would like to briefly discuss the core problem with concepts such
as obscenity and indecency, which is their inherent vagueness and sub-
jectivity. In our wonderfully diverse society, we all have widely diver-
gent views, ideas, and values, especially about what sexual expression is
positive or negative for ourselves and for our own children. Therefore,
we can't responsibly delegate these inherently personal choices to any-
one else, neither government officials nor our fellow citizens.
I want to describe a cartoon that well captures this reality. It shows
three people in an art museum looking at a classic nude female torso, a
fragment of an ancient sculpture, minus limbs. Each viewer's reaction is
shown in an air bubble. The first one thinks, "Art." The second one
thinks, "Smut." And the third one thinks, "An insult to amputees." In
such an inescapably subjective, value-laden area, it's inherently impossi-
ble to come up with clear guidelines. Accordingly, after its 1957 Roth
decision, which carved out the obscenity exception from the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court repeatedly tried and failed to come up
with an objective standard for defining constitutionally-unprotected ob-
scenity. The most famous line in the Court's many unsuccessful efforts
came from former Justice Potter Stewart, when he candidly confessed: "I
cannot define it, but I know it when I see it."' 6 Of course, the problem is
that each and every one of us sees a different "it." We individuals even
have different perspectives about whether any particular expression has
13. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14. United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 595-96 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev 'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
15. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d at 161-62.
16. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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any sexual content at all. That fact is captured by the old joke about the
man who sees every inkblot his psychiatrist shows him as wildly erotic,
and when his psychiatrist says to him, "You're obsessed with sex," the
man answers, "What do you mean I'm obsessed? You're the one who
keeps showing me all these dirty pictures."
The problem with these irreducibly vague concepts-obscenity and
indecency-is that enforcing officials will necessarily exercise their un-
fettered discretion according to their own subjective tastes or those of
politically-powerful community members. This means that the enforce-
ment patterns will be arbitrary at best, discriminatory at worst. At best,
which particular expression will be deemed off limits will be completely
unpredictable, which causes a chilling effect because no one wants to run
the risk of punishment. As a result, people self-censor by not engaging in
expression that might be deemed unacceptable to the powers that be.
That self-censorship not only violates the free speech rights of all those
who were deterred from speaking, but it also deprives the rest of us of
the chance to hear valued, constitutionally protected speech.
Let me illustrate the arbitrary, unpredictable nature of obscenity and
broadcast indecency enforcement by citing some recent FCC rulings. All
of these were issued in one single order in which the FCC exercised its
newly asserted power to punish even an "isolated" or "fleeting exple-
tive." However, the FCC has stressed that it won't always punish such a
word, because it has to exercise its discretion to take into account the
entire context. Accordingly, the FCC held that "bullshit" was indecent,
but that "dick" and "dickhead" were not. It held that "fuck 'em" was in-
decent, but that "up yours" and "kiss my ass" were not. The FCC held
that blues musicians' use of "fuck" and "shit" in Martin Scorsese's doc-
umentary film about them were indecent. But it held that actors' uses of
the very same words in the fictional film Saving Private Ryan were not.
In response to these inevitably erratic rulings, no wonder we have seen
so much self-censorship in broadcasting lately, including of material that
most parents would probably consider valuable at least for their older
children.
Whenever the government has this kind of essentially unfettered
discretion, it will likely exercise that discretion in a manner that's not
only arbitrary but, even worse, discriminatory. Government officials will
often single out expression that is produced by or appeals to individuals
or groups who are relatively unpopular or powerless. It's no coincidence
that recent obscenity prosecutions have targeted expression of lesbian
and gay sexuality as well as rap music by young African-American men.
Likewise, the FCC's crackdown on broadcasting indecency has dispro-
portionately singled out non-mainstream, countercultural expression-
lxx [Vol. 37:i
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for example, the song Your Revolution by feminist rap artist Sarah Jones,
not to mention the African-American blues musicians in the Scorsese
documentary.
In conclusion, I'd like to again quote one of Washington State's
own preeminent defenders of freedom for sexual expression-along with
David and Ron-Justice William 0. Douglas. I'd like to quote a portion
of Douglas' dissent from the Court's 1973 Paris-Miller cases upholding
the obscenity exception. He captures the general First Amendment phi-
losophy that should also apply to sexual expression in particular. He
wrote:
"Obscenity". . . is the expression of offensive ideas. There are re-
gimes in the world where ideas "offensive" to the majority . .. are
suppressed. There life proceeds at a monotonous pace. Most of us
would find that world offensive. One of the most offensive experi-
ences in my life was a visit to a nation where bookstalls were filled
only with books on mathematics and . .. religion. I am sure I would
find offensive most of the [material] charged with being obscene.
But in a life that has not been short, I have yet to be trapped into
seeing or reading something that would offend me. ... [O]ur socie-
ty . .. presupposes that ... the individual, not government, [is] the
keeper of his tastes, beliefs, and ideas. That is the philosophy of the
First Amendment[.]17
In closing, I would like to thank and salute Ron Collins and David
Skover, as well as Al Bendich, for their valued and invaluable efforts to
turn that philosophy into a reality.
17. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 71-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
lxxi










The Seattle University Law Review is published four times each year (fall, winter,
spring, and summer) by the students of the Seattle University School of Law.
Unsolicited manuscripts, including responses, are welcome. Please address all
submissions to the Editor in Chief at the above address.
The Law Review generally follows citation guidelines from The Bluebook: A
Uniform System of Citation (19th ed. 2010).
Subscriptions
The subscription rate for four issues is $28 per year (plus tax for Washington
residents). For a subscription, contact the Law Review office at the above address or
telephone number. Subscriptions are automatically renewed at the end of each year.
Back Issues
Back issues of the Law Review are available on either a single issue or volume
basis.
Order back issues directly from William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 2350 North Forest
Rd., Getzville, New York 14068. Phone: (800) 828-7571.
Host, National Conference ofLaw Reviews 2003
THIS PUBLICATION WAS PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS
THE UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND LAW REVIEW (VOLS. 1-17)
SEATTLE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW







RYAN DYER (Lead Articles)
ALEXANDRA CAGGIANO (Notes & Comments)
NICHOLAS CARLSON (Editor at Large)
Electronic Development Editor Symposium Chair






Business & Marketing Editor
LAUREN M. MARTIN
Research & Technical Editors Note & Comment Editors
DAVID BERGER JORDANN HALLSTROM
PHILIP CHINN KIERA MILLER
















































CHARLES R. T. O'KELLEY
J. CHRISTOPHER RIDEOUT
Seattle University School of Law
President of the University
STEPHEN V. SUNDBORG, S.J., S.T.D.
Executive Vice President
TIMOTHY P. LEARY, PH.D.
Provost
ISIAAH CRAWFORD, PH.D.
Chief Financial Officer/Vice President for
Finance & Business Affairs
CONNIE KANTER, M.B.A.
Interim Vice Presidentfor Student Development
MICHELE MURRAY, PH..D
Vice Presidentfor University Advancement
MARY KAY MCFADDEN, M.B.A.
Vice Presidentfor Enrollment Management
MARILYN CRONE, M.B.A
Vice President & University Counsel
MARY SAVILLA PETERSEN, J.D.
Vice President for Mission & Ministre'
PETER ELY, SJ.
Vice President for Universitv Planning & Vice Provost
ROBERT DULLEA, PH.D.














Assistant to the President
KATHY K. YBARRA, M.ED.
Board of Trustees of the University
PATRICK M. KELLEY, S.J.
MAUREEN LEE, Secretary
THOMAS M. LUCAS, S.1
MICHAEL C. MCCARTHY, SJ.
GORDON A. McHENRY, JR.






STUART T. ROLFE, Vice Chair
PETE J. ROSE
DAVID SABEY
JAMES D. SINEGAL, Emeritus
STEPHEN V. SUNDBORG, S.J., Ex Officio
STEVENS U. TRAINER








































Dean ofthe School ofLaw and Professor ofLaw
ANNETTE CLARK, B.A., J.D., M.D.
Associate Deans
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
PAUL HOLLAND, B.A., J.D., LL.M
Associate Dean for Strategic Planning & Mission
JOHN B. KIRKWOOD, A.B., M.P.P., J.D.
Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development
NATASHA MARTIN, B.S., J.D.
Associate Dean for Finance & Administration
RICHARD BIRD, B.B.A., M.B.A.
Associate Dean for Student Affairs
DONNA CLAXTON DEMING, B.A., J.D.
Associate Dean for Library & Educational Technology
KRISTIN A. CHENEY, B.S., M.L.S., J.D.
Assistant Deans
Assistant Dean for Admissions
CAROL COCHRAN, B.A., M.N.P.L.
Assistant Dean, Center for Professional Development
SHAWN LIPTON, B.A., J.D.
Assistant Dean for Student Financial Services
KATHLEEN KOCH, B.A., M.A.
Professors ofLaw
JANET AINSWORTH, B.A., M.A., J.D.,
John D. Eshelman Professor ofLaw
STEVEN BENDER, B.S., J.D.
MARILYN J. BERGER, B.S., J.D., Emeritus
JAMES E. BOND, A.B., J.D., LL.M., S.J.D., Emeritus
ROBERT S. CHANG, A.B., M.A., J.D.
MARK A. CHINEN, B.A., M.Div., J.D.
MARGARETCHON, A.B., M.H.S.A., J.D.,
Donald & Lynda Horowitz Professor for the Pursuit ofJustice
ANNETTE CLARK, A.B., J.D., M.D., Dean
SIDNEY DELONG, B.A., J.D., William C. Oltman Professor
of Teaching Excellence
JOHN EASON, B.S., J.D., LL.M.
DAVID E. ENGDAHL, A.B., LL.B., S.J.D., Emeritus
SHELDON S. FRANKEL, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Emeritus
CARMEN G. GONZALEZ, B.A., J.D.
LILY KAHNG, A.B., J.D., LL.M.
JOHN B. KIRKWOOD, A.B., M.P.P., J.D.
W.H. (JOE) KNIGHT, B.A., J.D.
PAULA LUSTBADER, B.S., J.D., Director, ARC Program
TAYYAB MAHMUD, B.A., M.Sc., M.A., J.D., PH.D.
HENRY W. MCGEE, JR., B.S., J.D., LL.M.
JOHN B. MITCHELL, B.A., J.D.
LAUREL CURRIE OATES, B.A., J.D.
CHARLES R.. O'KELLEY, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
CATHERINE O'NEILL, B.A., J.D.
MARK REUTLINGER, A.B., J.D., Emeritus
RICHARD SETTLE, B.A., J.D., Emeritus
JULIE SHAPIRO, B.A., J.D.
DAVID M. SKOVER, A.B., J.D.
Frederic C Tausend Professor ofLaw
RONALD C. SLYE, B.A., M. PHIL., J.D.
JOHN W. WEAVER, A.B., J.D.
KENNETH R. WING, B.A., M.P.H., J.D., Emeritus
Associate Professors of Law
BRYAN ADAMSON, B.S., PH.B., M.A., J.D.
J.D.DEBORAH AHRENS, B.A., M.P.P., J.D.
THOMAS ANTKOWIAK, B.A., J.D.
DAVID BOERNER, B.S., LL.B., Emeritus
DEIRDRE BOWEN, B.A., J.D., PH.D.
MELINDA J. BRANSCOMB, B.A., J.D., Emeritus
LISA BRODOFF, B.A., J.D., Director
Ronald A. Peterson Law Clinic
BROOKE COLEMAN, B.A., J.D.
CHRISTIAN MUKUNDA HALLIBURTON, B.A.,
PAUL HOLLAND, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
WON KIDANE, LL.B., LL.M., J.D.
NATASHA MARTIN, B.S., J.D.
RUSSELL A. POWELL, B.A., J.D., M.A.
ANDREW SIEGEL, B.A., M.A., J.D.
GREGORY M. SILVERMAN, A.B., M.A., J.D., M. PHIL.
DEAN SPADE, B.A., J.D.
JOHN A. STRAIT, B.A., J.D
Assistant Professors ofLaw
CHARLOTTE GARDEN, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
ANNA ROBERTS, B.A., M.A., J.D.
DIANE LOURDES DICK, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
Clinical Professors
BETSY HOLLINGSWORTH, B.A., J.D., Emeritus RAVEN LIDMAN, B.A., L.D., Emeritus
Professors ofLawyering Skills
ANNE M. ENoUIST, B.A., B.S., M.A.T.,
Director, Legal Writing Program
J. CHRISTOPHER RIDEOUT, B.A., M.A., PH.D.,
Associate Director, Legal Writing Program
LORRAINE K. BANNAI, B.A., J.D.
Associate Professors of Lawyering Skills
GILLIAN DUTTON, B.A., M.A., J.D.,
Director, Externship Program
CONSTANCE KRONTZ, B.S., J.D.
MARY BOWMAN, B.A., J.D.
JANET K.G. DICKSON, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
SARA RANKIN, B.A., J.D., M.ED
MIMI SAMUEL, A.B., J.D.
Access to Justice Institute
DIANA SINGLETON, B.A., J.D., Director
Alumni Relations
FE LOPEZ, B.A., J.D., Director
AdolfA. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society
CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY, B.A., J.D.. LL.M., Director
Center for Global Justice
TAYYAB MAHMUD, B.A., M. Sc., M.A., PH.D., J.D., Director
Fred T. Korematsu Centerfor Law & Equality
ROBERT S. CHANG, A.B., M.A., J.D., Executive Director
LORRAINE K. BANNAI, B.A., J.D., Director
Center for Indian Law & Policy
DOUGLAS NASH, B.A., J.D., Director
Professional Librarians
KRISTIN A. CHENEY, B.S., M.L.S., J.D.,
TINA S. CHING, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S.
KERRY FITZ-GERALD, A.B., M.A., J.D., M.L.I.S.
KELLY KUNSCH, B.A., M.L.S., J.D.
ROBERT MENANTEAUX, A.B., M.A., M.L.S.
KENT MILUNOVICH, B.A., M.L.I.S., J.D.
KARA PHILLIPS, B.A., M.A., M.L.S., J.D.
BARBARA SWATr ENGSTROM, B.A., M.L.I.S., J.D.
STEPHANIE WILSON, B.S., M.L.S., J.D.
Visiting Faculty
SARA AINSWORTH, B.A., J.D.
DENISE KNAPP, B.A., J.D.
KARENA RAHALL, B.A., M.A., J.D.
TRACEY ROBERTS
WILLIAM SHERMAN, B.A., J.D.
DENIS STEARNS, B.A., J.D.
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